home _|_ feature articles _|_ back issues _|_ about us _|_ subscribe _|_ links

 

Current Issue #52
Vol 24, No. 1

For texts of articles published within the past year, please contact us (info@sdonline.org) about buying a copy of the journal, or else contact our publishers through their website: www.tandf.co.uk/journals
______________

Table of Contents

______________


52 (Volume 24, No. 1)

Cuban Perspectives on Cuban Socialism


Preface by The Editors

Introduction, by Alfredo Prieto

Rafael Hernández
, Revolution/Reform and Other Cuban Dilemmas

Juan Valdés Paz, Cuba: The Left in Government, 1959-2008

Emilio Duharte Díaz, Cuba at the Onset of the 21st Century: Socialism, Democracy, and Political Reforms

Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Cuba’s Economy: A Current Evaluation and Several Necessary Proposals

Mayra Espina, Looking at Cuba Today: Four Assumptions and Six Intertwined Problems

María del Carmen Zabala Argüelles, Poverty and Vulnerability in Cuba Today

Marta Núñez Sarmiento, Cuban Development Strategies and Gender Relations

Aurelio Alonso, Religion in Cuba’s Socialist Transition

Rodrigo Espina Prieto and Pablo Rodríguez Ruiz, Race and Inequality in Cuba Today

Notes on Contributors







Designed & Powered by MediaTEK Consulting

Viewing Page: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 Next >>>

The Gendered Effects of the Reregulation of the Swedish Welfare State

For decades the Swedish Model was taken as the model of welfare state capitalism. This model, based on a commitment to full employment, centralized wage bargaining, and the principle of universalism, raised Sweden to the position of leader in welfare state politics. However, recent threats from external factors, such as globalization and Europeanization (in the form of the European Union), and internal factors, such as the abandonment of the core principles of the Swedish Model and a turn towards neoliberalism, have led to changes in the Swedish welfare state. These changes have occasioned major debates: 1) over globalization versus internal forces; 2) over the role of the state in this process; and 3) over the Third Way in Sweden. But another debate must take place over the effects these changes have had on women, and therefore on the future of the "state feminism" strategy that, until now, has borne results for Swedish women. Policies such as publicly provided childcare, and generous parental leave and pensions systems are of particular significance to Swedish women, who entered the paid labour force in record numbers in the 1960s and 1970s. These policies allowed and even encouraged women to have both a family and a paying job. Any changes to such policies thus threaten women's place both in the labour market and in the home or family.

Sweden is a Nordic country, with a population of nine million spread out over a large area. Many scholars speak of the "Swedish economic miracle" of the 20th century, which refers to how, in a few short decades, Sweden transformed itself from a poor agrarian country into one of the world's most prosperous and advanced industrial nations (Swedish Institute 2003a). Today, Sweden's major export industries include iron and steel, paper/forest products, electrical and computer equipment, and machinery. And, while Sweden has always been a capitalist country that relies on trade in a market economy, its social policy has always been much more socialist or, as Gregg Olsen refers to it, one of "nationalization of the means of consumption" (Olsen 2002: 11). This is, of course, an underlying theme of Sweden's social democratic welfare state.

Esping-Andersen's groundbreaking work, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), introduced a typology of welfare-state regimes which serve as ideal-types around which advanced industrial nations cluster; they are 'liberal,' 'conservative,' and 'social democratic.' Francis Castles, among others, argues that Esping-Andersen's typology has achieved 'classic' status (Castles 2001). Esping-Andersen's ambition in coming up with this typology was to offer a "reconceptualization and re-theorization on the basis of what [he] consider[s] important about the welfare state" (1990: 2). The major difference between the three regimes is whether it is the state (social democratic), the market (liberal), or the family (conservative) that is expected to provide for most of people's social welfare needs.

The social democratic welfare-state regime is best embodied in the Scandinavian countries, and is often typified by the Swedish welfare state, which emphasizes the role of the state to provide for its citizens' social needs. Social democratic welfare states promote an equality of the highest standards (not of minimum need), where all people are incorporated under one universal system. In such a system, "[a]ll benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 28). This kind of regime is also committed to full employment, and concentrates on allowing both men and women to reconcile their family and work responsibilities. It is clear that the social democratic welfare states are more committed to making equality a reality than are either the liberal or the conservative welfare states, which rely on market and family, respectively, to meet their citizens' welfare needs.

In coming up with his three welfare-state regimes, Esping-Andersen sought to identify the factors which produce these regimes; he identified three-the nature of class mobilization, class-political coalition structures, and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization. All of these factors helped to shape these three welfare-state regimes, and will also play a role in shaping their future. The historical legacy of regime institutionalization refers to the role of past reforms in establishing class preferences and political behaviour. The legacies of liberal, conser- vative, and socialist principles have become institutionalized and perpetuated in their respective welfare-state regimes over time (Esping-Andersen 1990; see also Pierson 1996).

Internal factors such as the state, industry, labour, the welfare legacy and societal norms play the most crucial role in determining policy direction; however, even these factors can be influenced or pushed forward by external factors such as globalization and Europeanization. Of course, this is not to discount the power or agency of particular people or social movements to change the path of a welfare state; it simply reveals the strength of those choices made in the past and the role they will play in future policy choices. The more neoliberal direction of Swedish state policy in the past two decades, particularly cuts to the welfare state, is actually out of step with public opinion, and could therefore lead to a crisis in representation (Ryner 1999). The welfare status quo remains very popular, and could constitute a serious obstacle to any reform (Esping-Andersen 2002a). As mentioned earlier, each nation has its own distinct welfare policy legacy and it would be very difficult, and politically damaging, to break from that legacy altogether.

Cross-national variations in the content of welfare states remain, despite powerful and similar domestic and external forces facing all nations. Olsen (2002) argues that a combination of Sweden's powerful labour movement, its more collectivist and statist values, and its more unified state structure have left it less vulnerable to these pressures; hence, welfare 'retrenchment' has been less severe in Sweden, and levels of poverty and inequality remain substantially lower in Sweden than elsewhere. The domestic conditions in each nation may serve to protect the national welfare state from external pressures, such as globalization, to some degree. The existence of a specific set of domestic conditions within each nation comes from decades, and even centuries, of social and cultural values being embedded within a particular political structure. New forces may challenge such values and structures, but their mere existence will filter how the challenge will be met.

Sweden's emphasis on the state and on publicly provided social services dates back to the development of 'the People's Home,' a metaphor for the supportive social democratic state (Daune-Richard & Mahon 2001). In the early 20th century, the concept of the 'People's Home' was developed to encompass the ideals of social democracy, including equality, full employment, and a comprehensive welfare state. This notion of the People's Home was developed by the Social Democratic Party (SAP), in coalition with farmer organizations (Esping-Andersen 1990), which proved to be a fruitful coalition for the development of the Swedish welfare state. The development of the People's Home has also been crucial to incorporating women and their concerns into the political agenda, as it enabled women to enter the paid labour force in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s.

Of course, the People's Home had to some degree relied on women's labour since its inception in the 1930s, allowing Sweden to avoid importing immigrant labour until much later. Indeed, concern arose already in the '30s with balancing women's place in the public sphere with family life. Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's The Crisis in the Population Question (1934) attempted to determine why fertility rates had been declining since the beginning of the 20th century. And while many, perhaps rightfully, argue that this reflects underlying racism within Swedish society, it is clear that importing immigrant labour also has racist implications, as well as sexist ones for those countries that would prefer to employ immigrants rather than their own female citizens. In other nations, immigrants were typically employed in low-paying, insecure jobs with little room for improvement. However, in the Swedish case, Swedish women entered similar types of employment with relatively high pay and benefits and much more control over balancing their work and family lives. As Daune-Richard and Mahon (2001) argue, the Swedish welfare state supported women's employment both by providing necessary services like childcare, and by creating jobs in the public sector that employed women.

Two crucial elements of the People's Home, the principles of centralized wage bargaining and solidaristic wages policy, were entrenched in the 1938 Saltsjobaden Basic Agreement between labour, the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), and capital, the Swedish Employers Association (SAF). The commitment to a comprehensive welfare state was entrenched in this historic compromise (Olsen 2002), whereby the LO and the SAF would negotiate a collective agreement that would be implemented by member unions and associations. Solidaristic wages policy, an important part of Sweden's corporatist arrangement, guaranteed "equalization of income across jobs, sectors and employers" (Clement 1994: 100). This agreement was closely tied to Sweden's commitment to full employment, which remained a high priority from the late 1930s to the early 1990s, being guaranteed through the Swedish welfare state (Jenson & Sineau 2001a). In fact, only Sweden and Norway, were able to translate this commitment into reality for most of the post-war period (Esping-Andersen 1990). Until the 1980s, open unemployment in both countries was under 3%, exceeding this benchmark only three times from 1950-1991 (Olsen 2002). This figure is even more remarkable in the Swedish case, when one considers the high levels of female participation in the labour force. By the early 1990s, women constituted 48% of the Swedish labour force (ibid.), the highest percentage anywhere in the world.

The Swedish version of full employment was unique, particularly due to two interrelated factors: high rates of women's employment, and high levels of employment in the public sector. The Swedish version of full employment relied on most people working most of the time in order to support the system (Myles 1994). The major mechanism used by the state to ensure this high employment, and high wages, was employment inside the welfare state. Such a system created wage pressure that forced out less efficient, low-wage jobs, resulting in fewer 'working poor' and a larger middle-income group. Also, under Swedish full employment, those who do not work, such as the elderly, can be provided with high incomes through the income security system, as there are enough people in the labour force to support such a system.

Viewing Page: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 Next >>>

   
 
Subscribe Now
 
We welcome your feedback and submissions ~~> Email us at info@sdonline.org
  home | feature articles | back issues | about us | subscribe | links
       
 
Socialism and Democracy
is a publication of the
Research Group on
Socialism and Democracy

© RGSD 2002
 
Socialism and Democracy
411A Highland Ave. # 321
Somerville, MA 02144
617-776-9505
info@sdonline.org