<<< Previous
Viewing Page: 1 | 2 |
3 | 4 | 5 Next >>>
In short, the successful communal CPR system is typically, just as in Marx's projection, "a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time"-with producers and communities wielding the knowledge needed to self-manage their system of appropriation from nature (Marx, 1985, p. 71). In addition, both Marx's projection and extant communal CPR systems contain "rights and obligations that defy a simple 'public or private' categorization." They both feature universal access rights and limitations on individual use (communal regulation of appropriation); hence both "resemble neither individualized private property systems nor common property (open access, state management) systems" (Usher, 1993, pp. 93, 95). Both reject the notion that "land or wildlife" should be "considered a commodity that could be alienated to exclusive private possession"; both protect "the right to obtain sustenance" from nature; and they both insist on "obligations that go with the right"-above all the obligation to keep appropriation from nature within sustainable bounds (pp. 95-6). For both, in short, communal property is "in effect a right to both individual livelihood and collective identity and existence," one in which "people do not think of themselves as 'owning' land or wildlife in any private sense" (p. 98).
Marxists
looking to extend Marx's vision of communism in ecological directions
can learn much from contemporary research on communal CPR management.
Ostrom, for example, emphasizes that in the most effective and sustainable
systems, user rights are "well-tailored" to the CPRs being appropriated
and to the broader system of social production within which such
appropriation occurs. Not only do "appropriation rules...reflect
the specific attributes of the particular resource," but they also "are
related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor,
materials, and/or money" (1990, p. 92). Penalties for violations
of appropriation rules are likewise tailored to the severity of the
infractions in both ecological and social terms, that is, in line with the losses of present and future use
values (or risks thereof) that they generate (p. 94). In addition,
the "individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource
units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries
of the CPR itself" (p. 91). Here, Usher notes that aboriginal-Canadian
systems often "combined principles of universal access and benefit
within the group," with "territorial boundaries that were permeable
according to social rules" (1993, p. 95). This is consistent with Ostrom's
observations of communal property
in larger-scale CPRs (e.g., regional and national water resources
used for irrigation), which indicate the necessity of "multiple layers" of "nested" associations
of users to regulate "appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance activities" (1990, p. 101). Such
research findings can lend some ecological concreteness to Marx's
projection of the association as one in which "not only municipal
administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the
State [is] laid into the hands of the Commune" (1985, p. 72).
At
the same time, contemporary researchers can learn from Marx about
the prerequisites of communal CPR management. Along with Marx's acute
awareness of the importance of combining natural and social scientific
insights, modern researchers could benefit from Marx's analysis of
capitalism's social separation of the producers from necessary conditions
of production-a separation that stands directly in the way of an
ecologically sound and communally beneficial management of these
conditions. Any extension of communal CPR management to the entire
system of human production hinges on a broad diffusion of decision-making
powers and scientific knowledge among producers and communities.
It also hinges, as Marx emphasizes, on large reductions in individual
work-times so that the producers will have sufficient free time to
engage in communal management and to develop their managerial capabilities.15 These changes are inconsistent with wage-labor and other key institutions of the capitalist economy (e.g., financial capital and market rents) that separate producers and communities from effective control over the conditions of production. The extension of communal CPR management is thus a direct infringement of the power of capital and its state functionaries. Without a frontal challenge to capitalist relations in favor of communal relations, extant pockets of communal CPR management will be isolated and marginalized by capital's ecologically unsound production on a global scale.
The
diversity of natural conditions means that any systemic eco-rationality
must encourage the maintenance and development of diverse ways of
life. An ecologically sound system will thus "reserve certain areas
of our planet, land and water" for "the preservation of older and
simpler ways of living," while supporting efforts by modern-day "communitarians" to "develop
viable communities that [are] increasingly independent of inputs
from technological society" (Dasmann, 1972, p. 212; 1975, pp. 136-7).
The preservation of such alternative paths of living will itself
require cooperation at all levels, based on a widely diffused knowledge
of the ecological practices involved and the potential losses to
society should they be "swamped out" by the dominant, more
industrial forms of production (Dasmann, 1972, pp. 212-3).
The
variety and diversity criterion is not based simply on the need for
humanity to adapt its development to a variegated environment. It
is a positive social value insofar as it signifies a rich plurality
of paths for human fulfillment and for developing people's natural
and social capabilities. An ecologically sound system must be cooperatively
managed by producers and communities willing and able to make prudent,
ecologically informed decisions on a day- to-day basis. Such a society
will have to provide a variety of channels for individual fulfillment,
based on "an extraordinary diversity of community lifeways" (Morrison,
1995, p. 181; cf. Dasmann, 1975, p. 159). Respect for variety and
diversity can also help society avoid the misuse of ecological thinking
as a rationale for a new tyranny of the collective over the individual
(Pepper, 1993, p. 125). An ecologically sound system "must take into
account varying needs and desires based on age, background, and personal
preference"; otherwise, "there will be very little support" for such
a system (Wright, 1983, p. 84). Without individual freedom and choice,
the system cannot be an effective "vehicle for debate and experimentation
that helps test what works best for different circumstances and objectives" (Brecher & Costello,
1994, p. 172; cf. Harvey, 1993, pp. 44-5).
Is
Marx's communist vision open to diverse forms of human production
and community, as required for society to healthily enmesh itself
with the variegated and evolving world of extra- human nature? The
answer does not hinge directly on The German Ideology's
projection of infinitely increased variety in individual human activity
once the association dispenses with all specialization of individuals' tasks
within its division of labor.16 Even if this forecast is relevant only for a distant future, Marx's adherence to the variety/diversity criterion is arguably ensured by the potential for free
human development that he sees created by capitalism and realized
under communism.
Marx
argues that capitalism is historically progressive not just because
it increases the productivity of social labor (thereby increasing
the potential free time of the producers), but because in
doing so it broadens and diversifies the natural and social conditions
of human production, thereby making possible a richer development
of indi- viduals (Burkett, 1999a). Capitalism's development of social production
opens up individual development to the universal scope and
variety of human and extra-human nature. At the same time, however,
capitalism restricts and degrades people and nature in line with
its requirements of exploitable labor power and conditions amenable
to its exploitation. Capital not only usurps workers' potential free
time, but also artificially simplifies, divides, and overextends
the wealth-creating powers of labor and nature, partly by alienating
scientific knowledge from producers and communities (Burkett, 1999b,
Chapters 7 and 11). As a result, the human development potentiated
by capitalism can only be realized through an explicit communalization
of the conditions of production and their conversion from means of
capital accumulation into means of de- veloping human beings. Given
capital's socialization of production, free individual development
and diversity in human ways of life require a communal regulation
of production.
In
short, Marx envisions communist production not just as a cooperative
planning project but, more important, as a condition and result of
free human development or "the all-round realisation of the individual"-"the development of the richness of human nature as an end in itself" (Marx & Engels,
1976, p. 309; Marx, 1968, pp. 117-8, emphasis in original). This
conception of human development conforms to the variety and diversity
criterion insofar as it foresees individuals for "whom the different
social functions... are but so many modes of giving free scope to
[their] own natural and acquired powers" (Marx, 1967, I, p. 488).
Communism's "full development of [human] capacities" means, according
to Engels, that "all members of society [can] develop, maintain
and exert their capacities in all possible directions" (1939, pp.
167, 221; emphasis in original). Practically speaking, of course,
such pursuit of diverse ways of life hinges on society's provision
to all individuals of "the means of cultivating [their] gifts in
all directions." In this sense, "personal freedom becomes possible
only within the community" (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 86).
Despite
this emphasis on free, multi-directional human development, Marx
and Engels do not directly address the diversification of communist
production relations under the influence of variegated natural conditions.
Nonetheless, Marx's analyses of production in general and capitalist
production in particular show an acute awareness
of how natural conditions help shape the organization of human production-and
this awareness is often expressed in terms suggesting an ongoing
mutual constitution of natural conditions and social production relations
under communism (Burkett, 1999b, Chapters 2-6). In Theories of Surplus Value,
for example, Marx points to "the fact that, in order to be exploited
really in accordance with its nature, land requires different social
relations" (1971, p. 301). In Volumes II and III of Capital,
Marx analyzes how the circulation of capital and rents are each shaped
(albeit anarchically, due to capitalism's exploitative and competitive relations) by the natural conditions specific to different
kinds of agricultural and non-agricultural industry (see Burkett,
1998, and 1999b, Chapter 7, for details). These analyses demonstrate
the need for an ecologically planned diversification of communism's
productive and community organization.
An
ecologically sound management of human production presumes that
people share a fundamental ecological ethic, however diverse its
forms. Ray Dasmann provides a wide-ranging consideration of this
ethical criterion. He points out that because "environmental conservation
represents a goal toward which we must work [together]," it is "not
something that can be achieved tomorrow by appeal to [individual]
self-interest"; it will thus "require a basic change of attitude
on the part of many people" (Dasmann, 1968, p. 95). There must be "an extension of ethics from
people to the land, and with this the development of an ecological conscience" in
which people "feel a deep sense of personal responsibility toward
the land" (p. 95; emphases in original). Given the cooperative
requirements of ecological management, people will need to "regain
a sense of community," and this "recovery of self-identity and awareness" as
a social and natural species "can come only through education":
Not
conservation education in the old sense, which too often has emphasized
only the economically profitable aspects of resource management, but
a new type of education based firmly upon a knowledge of human needs
and land ecology. A knowledge of psychology and the social sciences,
physical science and en- gineering, and biology are all an integral
part of the requisite educational pattern. The education must reach
not just the experts and specialists in conservation but must filter
through to everyone who is responsible for the land. (Dasmann, 1975,
pp. 158-9; 1968, p. 96).
Ethical
considerations clearly reinforce the important role of widely diffused
combinations of natural and social scientific knowledge in an ecologically
sound system.
In
sum, ecological values are at least as diverse as human ways of life;
but to effectively resonate through the system of human appropriation
from nature, these values must together constitute a shared sense
of unity with and responsibility toward the land and other natural
conditions as shared conditions of human life. In this sense,
an ecological ethics is by definition a communal ethics. Marx's projection
of the associated producers' shared sense of responsibility toward
the land, based on a new system of communal property rights and the
planned allocation of social labor enmeshed with natural conditions,
has already been noted. Marx sees this communal responsibility as
being reinforced by a broad diffusion of scientific knowledge and
a correspondingly heightened consciousness of the land as a source
of the "permanent necessities of life required by the chain of successive
generations" (1967, III, p. 617).
As
a framework for ecological ethics, the communal setting envisioned
by Marx is arguably far superior to capitalist private property and
markets. Consider, for example, the market-based approach to green-
house gas emissions, as championed by the U.S. government and corporate
capital. This approach commodifies pollution (or clean air, depending
on one's point of view) by "creating an international market in emission
credits." As Michael J. Sandel points out, this could "undermine
the ethic we should be trying to foster on the environment," because "turning
pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral
stigma that is properly associated with it" (Sandel, 1997, p. A19).
More specifically, "such trading would enable rich countries to buy
their way out of commitments to reduce greenhouse gases," thus "mak[ing]
pollution just another cost of doing business"- and this "may undermine
the sense of shared responsibility that increased global cooperation
requires" (Ibid.). By comparison, communal property in the conditions
of production and the "consciously regulated" utilization of these
conditions "in accordance with a settled plan," appears much more
congenial to the needed sense of shared responsibility (Marx, 1967, I, p. 80).
Marx's communism, which rejects both authoritarian state controls
and market prices and profits as resource-allocation devices, potentially
provides a framework within which alternative ecological values can
be openly and fairly articulated, juxtaposed, and reconciled or chosen
from.17
Ecologically
informed ethics cannot thrive unless they are routinely validated,
both materially and socially, by the system of production, distribution,
and consumption. The system must define "wealth" in human and ecological
terms, thereby promoting "a consistent change in the habits of production" (Bahro,
1978, p. 428). As Mumford puts it: "We need more wealth, but a wealth
measured in terms of life rather than profit and prestige" (1954,
p. 113). This ecological wealth criterion means
giving "primacy" to "simple reproduction with the employment of existing
energies and resources," while generally promoting "improvement in
quality as against the mere number of finished products" (Bahro,
1978, pp. 429-30). Ecological soundness requires that we no longer "gratuitously assume, as we constantly do, that the mere existence of a
mechanism for manifolding or mass production carries with it an obligation
to use it to the fullest capacity" (Mumford, 1954, p. 51). The system
must have a built-in recognition that due to the "dangers to the
earth's non-renewable resources, and to the natural environment of
human civilization and human life...consumption of material goods
and services cannot grow in an unlimited way" (Mandel, 1992, p. 207).
Some
would argue that while Marx's communism may foster a shared sense
of responsibility toward nature, this responsibility remains wedded
to a Promethean conception of nature as primarily an instrument or
subject of productive human labor. Alfred Schmidt, for example, suggests
that even "when Marx and Engels complain about the unholy plundering
of nature, they are not concerned with nature itself but with considerations
of economic utility" (1971, p. 155). However, Marx's conception of
wealth in general and natural wealth in particular encompasses the
full gamut of human needs, including aesthetic use values not reducible
to the industrial processing of natural conditions (Burkett, 1999b,
Chapter 2). As David Pepper observes: "Marx did see nature's role
as 'instrumental' to humans, but to him instrumental value
did not mean merely economic
or material. It included nature as a source of aesthetic, scientific
and moral value" (1993, p. 64). Insofar as Marx's communism places
use value in command of production, its wealth-creating priorities
and activities would encompass the maintenance and improvement of
natural wealth in all its aesthetic and material forms.18
Nonetheless,
many have suggested that Marx's vision of communist wealth is anti-ecological
because it features continued absolute growth of material production.
Marx and Engels do, in fact, make many references to ongoing and
even accelerated growth in the production of use values in the future
association. However, before rushing to the conclusion that Marx's
communism violates the ecological wealth criterion, two things should
be noted about these growth projections. First, they are always made
in close connection with Marx's vision of free and well-rounded human
development, not with growth of material production and consumption
for their own sake. Second, and of co-equal importance, they always
refer to growth of wealth in a general sense not limited to the kinds
of wealth involving industrial appropriation and processing of natural
conditions.
<<< Previous
Viewing Page: 1 | 2 |
3 | 4 | 5 Next >>>
|