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Thus for Marx, communism's expanded free time is not filled by orgies of consumption for consumption's sake but is rather a necessary condition for the development of social individuals who can master and redevelop the productive forces of nature, science, and social labor in environmentally and humanly rational fashion. True, the "shortening of the working-day" does enable individuals to enjoy the "material and intellectual advantages... of social development" (Marx, 1967, III, pp. 819-20). But this "increase of free time" also appears as "time for the full development of the individual" capable of "the grasping of his own history as a process, and the recognition of nature (equally present as practical power over nature) as his real body" (Marx, 1973, p. 542; emphasis in original). The intellectual development of workers during free time and work-time is clearly central to the process by which communist labor's "social character is posited...in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature" (p. 612). Marx's conception of free time as "time... for the free development, intellectual and social, of the individual" helps explain his projection that with communism "the measure of wealth is...not any longer, in any way, labour time, but rather disposable time" (1967, I, p. 530; 1973, p. 708).

As to the possible utilization of pre-capitalist ecological practices in post-capitalist society, I have already noted the similarity between Marx's conception of communist user rights and certain pre-capitalist traditions rejecting social or private sovereignty over the land. This similarity helps explain Marx's otherwise startling projection, near the end of his life, that the Russian commune could "become the direct starting point for the economic system towards which modern society tends" (1989b, p. 368; emphasis in original). In Marx's view, this "still archaic" village-level system of "communal ownership of the land" could "form the natural basis of collective production and appropriation," provided the villages could be organized into a planne system of "cooperative labour... on a vast, nationwide scale" (pp. 356, 368). True, Russia could only convert its communes into a "fulcrum of social regeneration" by adapting the "positive results" of capitalism to her specific natural and social conditions; it would especially have to apply "the tools, the manure, the agronomic methods, etc.," that is, "all the means that are indispensable to collective labour" in agriculture (pp. 356, 362, 371). But there is no evidence of any innate aversion on Marx's part to the potential use of more traditional commune productive practices as appropriate. Indeed, Marx argues that the extant commune organization could "ease the transition from parcel labour to collective labour, which [the Russian peasant] already practises to a certain extent in the undivided grasslands, in land drainage and other undertakings of general interest" (p. 356; cf. Foster, 1997, p. 288).

Even with all efforts to increase, disseminate, and apply knowledge about the environmental impacts of human production, a pro-ecological society will recognize that human knowledge regarding nature and the effects of human interventions therein can never be complete. Society must have an acute awareness of the limits to effective and safe human control over natural processes. This awareness must be codified in regulatory measures that restrict any uses of natural conditions having uncertain ecological impacts. Various forms of this environmental risk aversion criterion have been proposed. "Many indigenous peoples," for example, "take the position that all social policies should be entered into only after consideration of their likely implications, both environmentally and culturally, for descendants seven generations in the future. Consequently a number of seemingly good ideas for solving short run problems are never entered into because no one can reasonably predict their longer term effects" (Churchill, 1993, p. 451). In a similar vein, ecologist Sandra Steingraber suggests three basic principles for dealing with uncertain toxic effects of human production: the precautionary principle, which "dictates that indication of harm, rather than proof of harm, should be the trigger for action" limiting the source of toxic effects; the principle of reverse onus , under which "it is safety, rather than harm, that should necessitate demonstration," thus effectively "shifting the burden of proof off the shoulders of the public and onto those who produce, import, or use the [potentially toxic] substance in question"; the principle of the least toxic  alternative, which "presumes that [potentially] toxic substances will not be used as long as there is another way of accomplishing the task" (Steingraber, 1997, pp. 270-1).

Environmental risk aversion also motivates Vitousek et al.'s suggestion that society should "work to reduce the rate at which we alter the Earth system," because "ecosystems and the species they support may cope more effectively with the changes we impose, if these changes are slow" (1997, p. 499). The risk aversion criterion draws further support from "the need to keep a range of resource use options available to future generations" when, for example, "making a decision to develop hitherto untouched land" (Dasmann et al., 1973, p. 24). In the same spirit, Dasmann (1975) suggests that "preindustrial land-use systems...with a long history of successful adaptation to their environments and continuing productivity... should, if possible, be left alone," and that "all proposed changes in existing forms of land use, where the existing forms are successful, or show evidence of continuing success, must be subjected to careful ecological and sociological evaluation" (pp. 124-5). Here, the risk aversion criterion is quite consistent with and even complemented by the ecological knowledge criterion.

Marx and Engels do not refer directly to the shaping of communist production decisions by ecological risk aversion. But in pointing out the need to use a portion of the surplus product as a "reserve or insurance fund to provide against mis-adventures, disturbances through natural events, etc.," Marx does indicate that uncertain natural conditions and incomplete human control over natural processes continue to play a role even with communally planned production, especially in agriculture (1966, p. 7). These uncertainties are to be dealt with through "a continuous relative over-production" based partly on a "calculation of probabilities" (1967, II, p. 469; 1966, p. 7). "There must be on the one hand a certain quantity of fixed capital produced in excess of that which is directly required; on the other hand, and particularly, there must be a supply of raw materials, etc., in excess of the direct annual requirements (this applies especially to means of subsistence)" (1967, II, p. 469).¹⁰ Marx stresses the need for such an insurance fund due to unpredictable and uncontrollable natural conditions:

Entirely different from the replacement of wear and tear and from the work of maintenance and repair is insurance, which relates to destruction caused by extraordinary phenomena of nature, fire, flood, etc....Considered from the point of view of society as a whole, there must be continuous over-production, that is, production on a larger scale than is necessary for the simple replacement and reproduction of the existing wealth...so as to be in possession of the means of production required to compensate for the extraordinary destruction caused by accidents and natural forces. (1967, II, p. 177; emphasis in original)

Far from connoting any complete human control or overcoming of natural limits, "this sort of over-production is tantamount to control by society over the material means of its own reproduction" in the limited sense of a more rational social regulation of the productive interchange between the producers and uncontrollable natural conditions (Marx, 1967, II, p. 469). Hence, in his marginal notes on Adolph Wagner's Lehrbuch der Politischen Oekonomie, Marx projects that the associated producers "will direct production from the outset so that the yearly grain supply depends only to the very minimum on the variations in the weather; the sphere of production -the supply- and the use-aspects thereof-is  rationally regulated" (1975, p. 188; emphasis added). It makes perfectly good sense for "the producers themselves...to spend a part of their labour, or of the products of their labour to insure their products, their wealth, or the elements of their wealth, against accidents, etc." (Marx, 1971, pp. 357-8). "Within capitalist society," by contrast, uncontrollable natural conditions impart a needless "element of anarchy" to social production (1967, II, p. 469).¹¹

As noted above, Marx and Engels do envision a great expansion and broader social application of natural scientific knowledge under communism. But they see this knowledge as enhancing "real human freedom," not through a one-sided human domination of nature but rather through "an existence in harmony with the established laws of nature" (Engels, 1939, p. 126). This is very much in line with the heightened social consciousness of the unity of humanity and nature referred to earlier:

Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves-two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality....Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on natural necessity. (Engels, 1939, p. 125)

This conception of freedom does not deny the existence of definite limits to human knowledge and control over nature. The "established laws of nature" may, for example, encapsulate randomness and chaotic behavior in natural processes, thereby demarcating limits to the purposeful human manipulation of natural conditions. Presumably, in order to effectively "control" production "in harmony with" nature's laws, the associated producers must take such limits into account.¹²In this sense, at least, the Marx/Engels vision of communal production control is quite consistent with the principle of ecological risk aversion.

Many ecological thinkers would add cooperation to the list of core prerequisites for effective social management of natural conditions. Referring to the ecological threat posed by nuclear technology and inadequately regulated "technics" in general, Lewis Mumford goes so far as to assert: "If man fails to take the path toward world co-operation, on every level from government upward, there is no alternative that will not prove monstrous... Unconditional cooperation on a world scale is, therefore, the only alternative" (1954, pp. 32-3). Building an ecologically sound system of production is by nature a cooperative endeavor, because it involves not just resource management but also a reconstruction of the social institutions regulating the use of natural conditions. In such a process, both nature and society "evolve as part of the living world: their relationship and network are dynamic, not hierarchical" (Morrison, 1995, p. 181). Although many economists support the market as an efficient substitute for explicit cooperation, even they must admit that the pricing of natural conditions is-apart from other shortcomings- only an instrument for achieving predetermined goals. Insofar as these goals are not determined in cooperative-democratic fashion, the true use value of nature in all its ecological and social variety is unlikely to be represented (Burkett, 1999b, Chapters 7 and 13).

Marx's projection of communal property in the means of production arguably embodies the kinds of cooperative principles needed for an ecologically sound management of production. The most basic feature of Marx's communism is its overcoming of capitalism's social separation of the producers from necessary conditions of production-including natural conditions. This new union of labor and production conditions entails a complete decommodification of labor power and a new set of communal property rights in which individual workers enjoy shares in the total product (after deductions for social investment and social consumption) as well as a co-equal say in the administration of production itself. Associated production is production planned and carried out by the producers and communities themselves, without the class-based intermediaries of wage-labor, market, and state. Marx thus projects a system of "cooperative labor... developed to national dimensions"-and he insists that this "system starts with the self-government of the communities" (1974a, p. 80; 1989a, p. 519).¹³ As noted earlier, Marx and Engels insist on the extension of this communal oversight to land and other "sources of life" (Marx, 1966, p. 5).14 The "Association, applied to land" not only "brings to realization the original tendency inherent in land division, namely, equality" but "also reestablishes, now on a rational basis, no longer mediated by serfdom, overlordship and the silly mysticism of property, the intimate ties of man with the earth, since the earth ceases to be an object of huckstering" (Marx, 1964, p. 103).

The potential for ecological management of production through a communalization of natural conditions is clear from Elinor Ostrom's survey of communal property systems in common pool resources (CPRs) (Ostrom, 1990), and from Peter Usher's analysis of "aboriginal property systems in land and resources" in Canada (Usher, 1993). Both argue that communal management is a credible alternative to either private property with markets or centralized government control. Experience shows, however, that communal systems are most effective when they are run through associations set up and governed by resource users themselves, where "user" is defined in the broad sense of anyone whose well-being is significantly dependent on the CPRs in question. These associations ensure "the formal recognition of a non-moneyed property interest... a property right that arises from use" (Usher, 1993, p. 102). This basically corresponds to Marx's conception of "self-government of the producers" based on communal appropriation of the conditions of production (Marx, 1985, p. 72).

In aboriginal-Canadian systems, for example, there was "universal involvement and consensus in management," so that "management and production were not separate functions." As a result, "management 'data' included accumulated historical experience" directly grasped by resource users themselves (Usher, 1993, p. 96). Similarly, Ostrom's broader survey of communal systems suggests that in the most successful ones, all (or at least most) of the "individuals affected by the operational rules" for appropriating CPRs "can participate in modifying" these rules (1990, p. 93). Normally, "the rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external government authorities" (p. 101). At the same time, the monitoring of compliance with appropriation rules (including audits of CPR conditions), and the imposition of sanctions against rules violators, are under the control of the appropriators themselves, either directly or via directly accountable agents (p. 94). Successful systems also often feature "rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators" (p. 100).

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