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Race and the Racialized State:
A Du Boisian Interrogation
By Anthony Monteiro
The
events of September 11, 2001 did not begin, but accelerated, processes
that have for
some years been leading to the transformation of the US state and
political system. These historic processes have culminated in the
reconfiguration of the US state, establishing the hegemony of its
military industrial/national security and police/domestic control
sectors. As no less an authority than Richard Holbrooke puts it, "the
American military has acquired an unprecedented role in the conduct
of foreign policy."1 At the same time, many of the state's Welfare
or New Deal features are being downsized, privatized and eliminated.
Vast and radical attacks upon bourgeois democracy, civil and human
rights, and civil liberties are under way, justified by the need
for homeland security.
The
current moment of empire and the new relationship of forces within
the
state are crystallized
in the Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemptive War, the USA
Patriot Act, and the Homeland Security Act. The Justice Department
and the Homeland Security Department are designed as the command
centers of the attack upon civil and political rights. International
law and international institutions are being assaulted as the Bush
Administration proclaims its right to wage war unilaterally anywhere
in the world. The Administration has literally declared itself outside
of international law and thus a self-defined rogue state. In economic
terms a policy shift from Keynesian state economic and financial
policies to Friedmanite free market, neo-liberal ones, has taken
place.
Modern capitalism, bourgeois
democracy, globalization, and other contemporary phenomena of the
economy and culture are virtually incomprehensible without understanding
the modern racialized capitalist state. Such an understanding cannot
be carried on at the level of broad generalities; it must be specific
and concrete. The US state must be explained as it has emerged in
US history, in terms of
the specific stages of its development, its ideological contexts
and justifications, and the social psychology of its people, especially
as it relates to their understanding of authority and governance.
These social-psychological and ideological dimensions are particularly
important. It is safe to say that the American population, particularly
white people, views the current moment as a new and unsafe frontier.
There is a perceptible transformation of psychological and ideological
impulses among white Americans, a kind of collective traumatization,
as the business of empire has come home to roost. The psychological
and ideological moment is nourished by the concerns that ordinary
white people have with their own vulnerability, and by their awareness
that it is they who are called upon to make significant sacrifices
in the name of empire. It is in this milieu that we witness the attempt
of leading elements of the state to forge a new national identity
and sense of purpose.
The subjective realities
of ordinary white folk are filtered through the inevitable prisms
of race and white supremacy. The threat, therefore, is viewed as
a threat to white people as a collective and not solely to the economic
interests of the nation, or even to specific class interests. For
them the American dreamscape has been sullied and tarnished. Their
sense of security and expectation of privacy are wounded. Their dreamworld
has to be redeemed in order that the American psyche can be restored.
In the deepest sense the privileges of whiteness and white supremacy
are viewed as being under attack. Hence, the defense of America and
of democracy are viewed, at their core, as defenses of the global
rights of white people, articulated variously as defenses of civilization
or the West.
The
US state is the product of a distinct evolutionary history; it
is
an aspect of the evolution
of whiteness to autonomous legal status, i.e., from the idea of whiteness
as a product of nature and thus part of the natural order, to the
recognition of it as a social relational category constructed and
upheld by society and law: what Colette Guillaumin calls "the legal
enunciation of the physical (somatic, genetic, etc.)."2 In US
experience, the movement to elevate whiteness to autonomous legal
status demanded significant changes in the psychic and ideological
conditions of the dominant (white) group and the relegation of subordinated races
to the status of Other.3
The transformation of
the legal status of whiteness is decisive to the evolution of the
racialized state. The very existence of the racialized state confirms
the racialized nature of social relationships and negates the notion
that social relationships are above race. The legal constitution
of the racialized state, therefore, requires the elevation of whiteness
to a legally protected category like that of property.4 This
history can be broadly periodized into three stages: 1776-1873, 1873-1971,
and 1971 to the present.5 Each begins and ends in a transformative
economic and/or political crisis (except for the most recent stage,
which is still in process). The first stage is the pre-imperialist
stage of the US state, the second is the imperialist stage and the
third is the stage of empire. Another way to conceptualize these
stages is as (1) the pre-monopoly capitalist stage, (2) the stage
of state monopoly capitalism, and (3) the transnational globalization
stage. From the standpoint of state formation, each of these stages
was a level in the evolution of the racialized state. Each stage
is a level in the evolution of whiteness to autonomous legal status.
For instance, in the first stage race and whiteness as legal foundations
of the state are defined, more or less, by the three-fifths clause
of the Constitution and the Dred Scott Decision (1857), affirming
the protection of slaves as property and what amounts to the social
death of black folk. In the second stage it is Plessy v Ferguson and
the notion that whiteness is a form of property to be protected by
law. The deployment of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act (1964) and Voting Rights Act (1965) to defend
white privilege against African American claims, defines the legal
status of whiteness in the current stage. This represents a return
to the protection of whiteness enunciated in Plessy v Ferguson.
Whiteness in this understanding
is the dynamic and crucial factor of state formation. Traditional
Marxian historiography understands state formation in the US from
the standpoint of a class of slave owners, bankers, merchants, and
small capitalists seizing state power in the name of democracy and
the American nation. In this view, the American Revolution was a
bourgeois democratic revolution. Du Boisian historiography asserts
a racialized class, made up of slaveholders, merchants, bankers,
small farmers and workers (Du Bois, 1896 and 1935) who seized power and deployed
it to maintain the main form of property-slaves. It is significant
that Du Bois defines the slaves in Suppression (1896) as workers
and in Black Reconstruction (1935) as a proletariat. Here rests his visionary reconceptualization of class struggle and revolutionary
agency. Indeed, it is the working class or proletariat as suggested by Marx that
constitutes the revolutionary agency of modernity. Du Bois, however,
in an act of profound theoretical displacement, argues that the racialized
proletariat, the slaves, are the principal agency of progressive
and revolutionary change. In this framework, the racialized identity
of slaves implies giving a similarly racialized definition to the classes which comprise white people. In fact, the racialized
dimension of these identities is overdetermining of other social
relationships. The bourgeoisie in the American context (and to some
degree in the European contexts and certainly in South Africa) is
preeminently white. The working classes are, therefore, racially
identified. All classes and strata of white people identify themselves
as a separate race-class from blacks and identify the nation and
the state in racialized terms. Hence, one can speak of a racialized
nation-state; and within this mixture, the core, or organizing mechanism
of race, class, nation, and nationality is the racialized state.
The
slaves constituted in Du Bois's thinking the principal proletarian
agency in 19th-century
US history. The racialized self- identification of white workers
(what Du Bois called "a wage for whiteness") bound them more strongly
to the white bourgeoisie than to the Black proletariat.6 This wage
for whiteness is, so to speak, an ontological benefit to being identified
as white. Hence, an ontological identification exists between white
workers and white slave owners, white workers and white capitalist
etc. The state, therefore, is not just a mechanism of class rule;
it is a mechanism of race-class rule. This rule is organized upon
the ideology of white supremacy. Hence, the boundaries between the
ruled and the rulers along class lines are blurred and fluid, while
the real and most enduring boundaries are between the racially dominant
and racially subordinated groups. Furthermore, as Du Bois suggests,
the racially oppressed constitute the proletariat and within
them resides the vast reservoir of proletarian consciousness and
agency (Du Bois, 1935: ch. 4, "The General Strike"). The "class struggle" in
this Du Boisian construal is organized around the struggle against
white supremacy, and its central organizing principle is the struggle
for black freedom. The racialized state functions as the instrument
of white unity and white ideological identity against the threat
of the black race-class and its proletarian core.
Du
Bois's
conceptualization of the US state as a racialized instru- ment
does not negate the
Marxist theory of the state. His theory advances Marxism, realizing
a new and more accurate synthesis. The Du Boisian construal is both
theoretically elegant and highly predictive. Furthermore, it breaks
out of the reductionist strategies of class essentialism and methodological
individualism. This Du Boisian standpoint informs a growing body
of scholarship. As a result, a significant reexamination of state
theory and its legal implications is occurring. Some of this is associated
with the school of critical race theory, and thinkers such as Derek
Bell, Patricia Williams, Cheryl Harris, Kimberle Crenshaw, and Charles
Mills. Alongside these is the school known as whiteness studies,
or race traitors, whose proponents are David Roediger, Noel Ignatiev,
Theodore Allen, and Joe Feagin, among others. Writers like Bernard
Magubane and Clarence J. Munford have thought deeply about
the state using traditional Marxism as a starting point, but going
beyond it in a Du Boisian manner. Their line of research and reasoning
represents the most fruitful approach to understanding the racialized
state.
Charles Mills argues
that the US state is formed out of a racial contract among white
folk. The state, he suggests, is an a priori condition of
modern racialized societies. Bernard Magubane shows a similar process
with respect to South African state formation. Magubane's study examines
a white settler colony and the modalities of state formation that
emerged from the conflicts and cooperation between English and Dutch
settlers to control the African majority of South Africa. The historical
account of the US state emphasizes that it was formed and legitimated
by white people based upon a protracted history of compromise, conflict,
civil war and armed struggle among themselves, accompanied by a long,
brutal history of betrayal by white working and middle class people
of black slaves, workers, sharecroppers, and middle classes. The
betrayal of the Negro, to use Rayford Logan's phrase, is critical
in every moment of state formation and legitimation in American history.
Noel Ignatiev's study How The Irish Became White and David
Roediger's The Wages of Whiteness are recent explanations
of the consequences of the white working class's betrayal and its
role in the legitimation of whiteness. Ignatiev says...
In
the combination of Southern planters and the "plain republicans" of
the North, the Irish were to become a key element. The truth is
not, as some historians
would have it, that slavery made it possible to extend to the Irish
the privileges of citizenship, by providing another group for them
to stand on, but the reverse, that the assimilation of the
Irish into the white race made it possible to maintain slavery (1995:69).
Mary
Frances Berry (1994) takes the story further, urging that the US
state and Constitution
were forged in
the struggle to contain black resistance. The logic of Berry's position
is that whiteness and the racialized state function to suppress Black
resistance and maintain Blacks as a "sub-proletariat." Lerone Bennett
Jr. (2000) argues that through it all Lincoln was unprincipled vis-à-vis the
freedom of the slaves, and that had he lived beyond 1865, he would,
like Jefferson, have slaughtered the ideals of the nation upon the
altar of white supremacy. Lincoln, in Bennett's narrative, was another
of a long line of white betrayers of blacks. What is missing in Bennett's
account is that Lincoln as President was first and foremost a defender
of the racialized state, which both constrained and facilitated his
actions. Nonetheless, his and Berry's interpretations are as close
as one can come, within the confines of academic discourse, to arguing
that the US is a racist state.
Finally, the crucial
moment in defining white rights and black denial and hence updating
the US Constitution to reflect the new stage of US racial and economic
life was the famous Plessy v Ferguson decision of 1896. Cheryl
Harris (1993) insists that race and property rights define the foundation
of US Constitutional law and that whiteness is a form of property
to be protected under the Constitution.
The legal evolution of
whiteness begins with the 3/5 clause of the Constitution and is perfected
through multiple political and Constitutional interpretations and
rulings. Among these are the Dred Scott Decision (1857), Plessy
v Ferguson (1896), and most notably recent interpretations of
the US Supreme Court with respect to race and whiteness. Cheryl Harris
(1993: 1753) contends that in its landmark Brown v Topeka Board
of Education decision (1954), the Court dismantled an older form
of whiteness as property (as upheld in Plessy), but dialectically
permitted its reemergence in a more subtle form, i.e., accepting
as normal de facto societal inequities between blacks and whites.
As Harris puts it, "In accepting substantial inequality as a neutral
base line, a new form of whiteness as property was condoned." Hence,
the anti-affirmative action rulings of the Court in Bakke (1978), City
of Richmond v J.A. Croson (1989), and Wygant v Jackson Board
of Education (1986) were the Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to protect the property
interest in whiteness (Harris, 1993: 1766). Derek Bell Jr. (1995:
23) insists that racial equality is not deemed legitimate by large
segments of the American people, "at least to the extent it threatens
the societal status of whites." He then points out that because of
the prevailing attitudes of whites to racial equality the 14th Amendment
may not be available as a remedy in cases of racial discrimination.
In the current context, therefore, most legal remedies to
counter racial discrimination have been trumped, thereby transforming
the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment into a defense
of whiteness, rather than a protection for those historically deprived
of civil rights.
The evolutionary history
of whiteness is connected to the state in much the way that the state
is to the nation. Whiteness and white supremacy operate as deep structural
foundations or unstated assumptions underlying state power and state
organization. White (or American) nationalism is, in this configuration,
the political manifestation of whiteness. The racialized US state
is the central political organ of white power. It is, however, a
complex network of relationships and socio-political forces. It is
a site of intense political and ideological conflict. It is neither sui generis,
nor above the political and economic realities of the historical,
socio-political and ideological contexts within which it exists.
Thus one can observe command-and-control functions of the US state
as well as mediation functions. Liberal theory generally points to
the mediation or "above class" functions (Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974);
Marxists and other radical theorists point to the command-and-control
functions as primary (see Engels, 1884, and Lenin, 1918, as modern
classics). There is another view, a reform socialist or democratic
socialist stance (see Desai, 2002: 297), which believes that modern
capitalism has wide possibilities of democratic expansion and reform
through the expansion of civil society and non-governmental institutions.
And certainly it is clear that both radical and liberal commentators
on the US state make credible arguments supporting their views. However,
the deeper issue is how it functions to configure, defend and promote
race and race relations at particular historical moments. In this
respect neither liberal nor traditional radical views are adequate.
What is called for is an understanding of the US state as a racialized
mechanism that is the principal organizer of racialized power. As
an instrument of racialized power, i.e. the power of white people
over non-whites, especially black people, it functions to mediate class
conflict and fissures among whites and to exert primarily command-and-control
functions with respect to blacks. This
situation is not only deeply contradictory, but also profoundly ironic.
Blacks, the most consistently democratic force in the country, have
benefited least from democracy. Remaining outside of the social contract,
excluded from the liberal framework constructed and defended by the
state, and the chief objects of the state's command-and-control functions,
they appear almost as a stateless people, somewhat like the Palestinians
or black South Africans under apartheid.
However,
the theoretical defenders of the liberal "mediating" state are also defenders of
the notion of a colorblind state, and thus are themselves blind to
the historically constituted race-determined nature of the US state.
It is they, in the end, not the US state, that are colorblind-a colorblindness
which itself, as Charles Mills points out, entrenches white privilege.7
However, in being blind to the racial nature of the state, they ignore
the state's command-and-control functions, which are overwhelmingly
constructed upon and defined by its role as defender of racialized
social relationships. The liberal democratic state should have a
sign outside its door that reads, "For Whites Only."
The race-class problematic
in the formation and evolution of state power in the US is a special
instance of the evolution of the state in general. This race-class
situation complicates the realities of the state and the theories
that attempt to explain it. There is a dynamism and fluidity to the
US state that defies an either/or analysis. The class dimension of
the state is dialectically contingent on its race dimension. Class,
in a certain sense, is thus sabotaged as the central organizing dynamic
of the racialized state. The very fluidity of race and whiteness,
their historical contextualities and contingencies, their dynamic
and changing political and social identities, makes for a certain
indeterminacy with respect to the formations and evolutions of the
racialized state. The racialized state is thus an unstable, ever-evolving
structure. A major destabilizing factor is demographic change, resulting
from immigration and from low birth rates among whites. This occasions
the need to redefine whiteness in such ways as to guarantee a white
majority, as a condition of legitimation of white authority. Non-black
immigrants are faced with complex negotiations between anti-black
racism and whiteness. Many Latinos and Asians are so positioned as
to become in a generation white.
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